This paper is devoted to systematic studies of some extensions of firstorder Gödel logic. The first extension is the first-order rational Gödel logic which is an extension of first-order Gödel logic, enriched by countably many nullary logical connectives. By introducing some suitable semantics and proof theory, it is shown that the first-order rational Gödel logic has the completeness property, that is any (strongly) consistent theory is satisfiable. Furthermore, two notions of entailment and strong entailment are defined and their relations with the corresponding notion of proof is studied. In particular, an approximate entailment-compactness is shown. Next, by adding a binary predicate symbol d to the first-order rational Gödel logic, the ultrametric logic is introduced. This serves as a suitable framework for analyzing structures which carry an ultrametric function d together with some functions and predicates which are uniformly continuous with respect to the ultrametric d. Some model theory is developed and to justify the relevance of this model theory, the Robinson joint consistency theorem is proven.
Introduction
The goal of this paper is twofold. On one hand, we are aiming to study some logical aspects of extensions of first-order Gödel logic and on the other hand, to introduce an alternative framework for (continuous) metric logic. The fuzzy logic is a branch of mathematical logic dealing with systematic studies of logical aspects of different types of many-valued logics, whose main emphasis rely mostly on introducing a relevant semantics for a given many-valued logic, exploring a (complete) set of axiomatic system and ultimately proving some kind of completeness results [10, 1] . The Lukasiewicz and Gödel logics [14, 6, 2, 8, 11] ric. That is why one may believe this is a natural approach towards studying ultrametric structures. To emphasize on this natural approach, this new logic is called the ultrametric logic.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to study the first-order rational Gödel logic. First, by defining a suitable semantic and giving an axiomatization system, it is shown that the first-order rational Gödel logic satisfies that completeness theorem (Theorem 2.20). Then, two notions of entailment and strong entailment are discussed and their connections to the corresponding notion of proof are explored. In particular, it is proven that the first-order rational Gödel logic satisfies the approximate entailment compactness (Theorem 2.24).
The third and fourth sections include the key notion of ultrametric logic and some model theoretic machineries developed for proving the Robinson joint consistency theorem for this logic (Theorem 4.15).
The paper is concluded by given some guidelines as how to proceed this research further in order to explore the relevance of this logic for understanding the interesting mathematic structures.
Rational Gödel Logic
In this section the first-order rational Gödel logic is given. The syntactical issues of this logic is the same as the usual first-order Gödel logic. However, the semantical aspects which is given here are somewhat different from the usual approach if fuzzy logic. Opposite to the usual conventions in fuzzy logic, the nullary connective0 is assumed as the absolute truth, while1 as the absolute falsity. Moreover a formula is satisfied in a model M if its interpretation in M is zero. This approach is taken from the (continuous) metric logic and will be justified when the ultrametric logic is introduced. Furthermore, it would be very easy to see that all of the results in this section can be translated to usual semantical approach in (fuzzy) first-order Gödel logic.
Throughout this paper, suppose L is a first-order language with countably many predicate, function and constant symbols. As usual, we also assume a countable set of variables together with the set of boolean connectives {∨, ∧, →, ¬,0,1} and the set of quantifiers {∀, ∃}. The rational Gödel logic RGL * is obtained by extending the set of nullary connectives {0,1} with the set A = {r : r ∈ [0, 1] Q = Q ∩ [0, 1]} of nullary connectives. The corresponding notions of L-terms, (atomic) L-formulas and subformulas are defined as usual. In particular, the notion of free variables, bound variables and sentences, i.e., formulas without free variables are considered as classical first-order logic. The set of L-formulas and L-sentences are denoted by F orm(L) and Sent(L), respectively. For an L-formula ϕ, Sub(ϕ) is the set of subformulas of ϕ. An L-theory is an arbitrary set of L-sentences.
Below, the semantical aspects of RGL * are introduced. Unlike the standard semantics, the set I = [0, 1] 2 \ {(0, r) : r > 0} with the lexicographical ordering is taken as the set of truth values, since as otherwise the compactness theorem fails if the standard set of truth values [0, 1] is assumed. For simplicity, we use the notationr instead of (r, r) ∈ I. Definition 2.1. An L-structure M is a nonempty set M called the universe of M together with: a) for any n-ary predicate symbol P of L, a function
An M-assignment of variables is a function σ from the set of variables into the set M . The interpretation of L-terms is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2. Let M and σ be as above and letx = (x 1 ...x n ). Then, for every term t(x),
The interpretation of L-formulas inside an L-structure M is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3. Let M be an L-structure and σ be an M-assignment.
for everyr
Note that 5 and 6 are well-defined, since I is a complete ordered set, i.e., any subset of I has the least upper bound and the greatest lower bound, respectively.
The following connectives ¬, ∨, ↔, ⇒ are given in terms of the above connectives.
Hence, their interpretations can be accordingly computed. In particular,
where
and an L-theory T ,
In this situation, we write M |= ϕ(ā). T is satisfiable in M, if M |= ψ for every ψ ∈ T . This is denoted by M |= T .
2. For an L-sentence ϕ, we say that T entails ϕ, T |= ϕ, if for any Lstructure M |= T , M |= ϕ.
3. Likewise, T strongly entails ϕ, T
T is called a satisfiable L-theory if there is an L-structure M |= T . T is a finitely satisfiable theory if every finite subset of T is satisfiable.
Axioms and the Proof System
This subsection is devoted to introducing a complete proof system for RGL * . The first part of axioms of RGL * are the axioms of propositional Gödel logic [10] .
The following axioms state the properties of the quantifiers ∀ and ∃.
The inference rules are modus ponens and generalization:
The notion of proof is defined as usual. When an L-theory T proves an Lsentence ϕ, we denote it by T ⊢ ϕ. T is called consistent if T 1 . Otherwise, it is inconsistent. The deduction theorem is stated as follows.
An L-theory T is linear complete if for every pair of sentences (ϕ, ψ), either
Lemma 2.6. (Substitution lemma) Let Γ be an L-theory and R, S be two nullary predicate symbols. Moreover, suppose Γ(R, S) ⊢ χ(R, S). Then, for every Lsentences ϕ and ψ, Γ(ϕ, ψ) ⊢ χ(ϕ, ψ).
Proof. Straightforward using the notion of proof.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that T is an L-theory and ϕ, ψ, χ ∈ Sent(L). Then,
Proof. (i)-(vii) are obvious, [10, Chapter 2] . For (viii), by G6,
So, by modus ponens,
On the other hand, by G1,
Therefore, by modus ponens,
Now, by (vi) and using (v), we have
Now, by (1), (2) and using (iv), we have
Thus, by definition of ∨,
Other axioms of RGL * called the book-keeping axioms, that is for anyr,s ∈ A, (RGL1)r ∧s ↔ max{r, s},
r →s if r ≥ s, (r →s) ↔s if r < s, (RGL3) ¬¬r, for all r < 1.
The following fact is used in the proof of the completeness theorem and its proof can be found in [10, Chapter 2]. Then, ∼ is an equivalence relation.
Then, ≤ G defines a partially order relation on G.
is a resituated lattice with the largest element [1] T and the least element [0] T where . ∧ and . → form an adjoint pair, i.e., for all a, b, c ∈ G,
In some literatures, G is called a G-algebra and the structure (G, .
The following crucial definition is needed for the completeness of RGL * .
Definition 2.9. An L-theory T is called strongly consistent if T r for every r > 0.
Clearly, if T is a strongly consistent theory then for each r > 0, we have
Remark 2.10. Using the usual proof of soundness theorem, one may show that if T ⊢ ϕ then T |= ϕ for every L-theory T and L-sentence ϕ.
Completeness of RGL *
In this subsection, it is shown that any strongly consistent theory is satisfiable. Consequently, the compactness theorem is proved. Our proof is based on Henkin construction. First, some preliminary lemmas are given.
Lemma 2.11. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory in RGL * and ϕ, ψ ∈ Sent(L). Then, either T ∪ {ϕ → ψ} or T ∪ {ψ → ϕ} are strongly consistent.
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that both T ∪ {ϕ → ψ} and T ∪ {ψ → ϕ} are not strongly consistent. So, there are r, s > 0 such that T ∪ {ϕ → ψ} ⊢r and T ∪ {ψ → ϕ} ⊢s. Thus, by the deduction theorem, T ⊢ (ϕ → ψ) →r and T ⊢ (ψ → ϕ) →s. Without loss of generality, we may suppose that min{r, s} = r. Therefore, by RGL2, ⊢s →r. Now, using Lemma 2.7(v), we have T ⊢ (ϕ → ψ) →r and T ⊢ (ψ → ϕ) →r. Hence, by G6, we have T ⊢r, a contradiction.
Next, the notion of maximally strongly consistent theory is defined. Definition 2.12. A strongly consistent theory T is called maximally strongly consistent if it can not be properly included in any strongly consistent theory, i.e., for any strongly consistent theory Σ, if T ⊆ Σ then T = Σ. Lemma 2.13. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory. T is maximally strongly consistent if and only if
Proof. (1) is easily derived from Lemma 2.11. For (2), let T ⊢r → ϕ for all r > 0. We show that T ∪ {ϕ} is strongly consistent. Suppose on the contrary, T ∪{ϕ} is not strongly consistent. Then, there is k > 0 such that T ∪{ϕ} ⊢ k. So, by the deduction theorem, T ⊢ ϕ →k. Hence, using Lemma 2.7(v), T ⊢r →k for all r > 0. In particular, if we take r < k we get a contradiction. Conversely, let (1) and (2) hold and Σ be a strongly consistent theory containing T . If ϕ / ∈ T then it implies there exists r > 0 such that T r → ϕ. So, ϕ →r ∈ T and therefore, ϕ →r ∈ Σ. Thus, ϕ / ∈ Σ. Now, an easy application of Zorn's lemma ensures the existence of a maximally strongly consistent extension of every strongly consistent theory. Hence, the following lemma is established.
Lemma 2.14. There exists a maximally strongly consistent extension of every strongly consistent theory.
Lemma 2.15. Let T be a maximally strongly consistent theory and
Proof. Proof is straightforward. Now, the definition of a Henkin theory is given.
Theorem 2.17. Assume T is a strongly consistent L-theory. Then, there exist an extensionL of L and a maximally strongly consistent HenkinL-theoryT containing T .
and take a maximally strongly consistent L n -theoryT n containing T n . Take
Proof of claim 1. Suppose not. Therefore, T n+1 ⊢k for some k > 0. So, there is a finite subset Σ of {(r → ∀x ϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s) : ϕ(x) ∈ F n , r > s > 0} such that T n ∪ Σ ⊢k. Take Σ to be minimal. For θ ϕ(x),r,s ∈ Σ, let Γ = Σ \ {θ ϕ(x),r,s }. Now, by showing thatT n ∪ Γ ⊢k, we get a contradiction.
SinceT n ∪Γ∪{θ ϕ(x),r,s } ⊢k, by the deduction theorem,T n ∪Γ ⊢ θ ϕ(x),r,s →k, i.e.,T
Therefore, by Lemma 2.7(vii),
Since ⊢s → ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s , (4) impliesT n ∪ Γ ⊢s →k. Now, since r > s, by RGL2 and Lemma 2.7(v),T n ∪ Γ ⊢r →k.
AsT n ∪ Γ k , it follows from (3) thatT n ∪ Γ r → ∀x ϕ(x). But, sinceT n is a maximally strongly consistent L n -theory and (r → ∀x ϕ(x)) ∈ Sent(L n ),
On the other hand, by (4) and Lemma 2.7(vii),
Therefore, by G∀3,T
Moreover, by G∀2,
(6) and Lemma 2.7(v) imply thatT n ∪ Γ ⊢s →r. Furthermore, as r > s, by RGL2 and (5),T
Now, using the above claim for each n ≥ 0, one may inductively define a language L n and a strongly consistent L n -theory T n . LetL = n<ω L n andT be a maximally strongly consistentL-theory containing n<ω T n . We show that T is also a HenkinL-theory. Clearly, as n<ω T n is strongly consistent,T exists. To show thatT is Henkin, letT ∀x ϕ(x) for some ϕ(x) ∈ F orm(L). Now, sinceT is maximally strongly consistent there exists r > 0 such thatT r → ∀x ϕ(x). But, (r → ∀x ϕ(x)) ∨ (ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s) ∈T impliesT ⊢ ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ) →s and so,T ϕ(c ϕ(x),r,s ).
The following technical lemma is needed for Theorem 2.19.
• L ′ = L ∪ {α ψ , β ψ : ψ ∈ S} ∪ {γ} where α ψ , β ψ and γ are some new nullary predicate symbols.
• T ψ = T ∪ {α ψ ⇒ ψ, ψ ⇒ β ψ } ∪ {s → α ψ : T ⊢s ⇒ ψ} ∪ {β ψ →r : T ⊢ ψ ⇒r}.
• T 1 = T ∪ {ψ ⇒ γ} ∪ {γ →r : r < 1}.
•
If T is strongly consistent then so is T ′ .
Proof. We only show that T ψ is strongly consistent. If not, then there exist a finite subset ∆ of T andk such that,
We may suppose both sequences {s i } n i=1 and {r j } m j=1 are increasing. So, we have
Now, using the substitution Lemma 2.6, one can replace α ψ bys 1 and β ψ bȳ r m and conclude:
On the other hand,
Thus, T ⊢k, a contradiction.
Theorem 2.19. Let Σ be a maximally strongly consistent L-theory and G be the RGL-algebra of classes of Σ-equivalent sentences introduced in Lemma 2.8. Then, there is a continuous order preserving map g from G into I (that is all suprema and infima preserved by the map g).
Proof. For any a ∈ G, set
To construct g, for any a ∈ G, we define g a from a G to
and let g = a∈G g a . Lemma 2.18 shows that one may extend the language L so that for any [0] Σ < G a, a G has at least two distinct elements, and furthermore, for any rational number 0 < r < 1, there are two distinct elements a, b In the light of the above Lemma 2.18, (1) and (2) simultaneously hold. The proof is completed, if we show that g = a∈G g a is a continuous order preserving function. Linear completeness of Σ implies that whenever a G < b G , there is r > 0 such that a < G [r] Σ < G b and whence, g is an order preserving function. To prove the continuity of g, let A ⊆ G and sup A = α and inf A = β. We have to verify that sup g(A) = g(α) and inf g(A) = g(β), respectively. We only show that sup g(A) = g(α) and the other case is similar. The proof is divided in two different cases: a) α ∈ a G for some a ∈ G, and furthermore, there is some e = α in A such that e ∈ a G . In this case, continuity of g a implies that
b) α ∈ a G and there is no element of A in a G . Subsequently, we have two subcases:
On the other hand, as sup g(A) ∈ I a , it implies sup g(A) = min(I a ). Therefore, sup g(A) = g(α). b2) g(α) ∈ I a , but sup g(A) / ∈ I a . This means sup g(A) < g(α). So, there is a rational number r < st(a) such that sup g(A) <r < g(α). Therefore, sup g(A) < g([r] Σ ). But, this contradicts the fact that α is the least upper bound of A.
Next, the completeness theorem is established for RGL * .
Theorem 2.20. (Completeness of RGL * ) In RGL * , any strongly consistent theory is satisfiable.
Proof. Let T be a strongly consistent L-theory. By Theorem 2.17, there is a first order languageL containing L and a maximally strongly consistent Henkin L-theory Σ containing T . LetḠ be the RGL-algebra of classes of Σ-equivalent sentences introduced in Lemma 2.8. Since Σ is linear complete, G is a linear ordered set. Now, in the light of Theorem 2.19, there is a continuous order preserving map from G into I. Therefore, one can define an L-structure M as follows.
a) The universe of M is the set of all closedL-terms.
c) For each n-ary predicate symbol P , define P M : M n → I as
A straightforward induction on the complexity of formulas shows that
Also, one may study the strong completeness with respect to the strong entailment.
Completeness with respect to the strong entailment
In this subsection, we investigate the relationship between strong entailment and deduction. First, we prove the weak completeness of RGL * . A different but similar proof can be found in [9, Theorem 4.7] . Proof. Let ϕ in RGL * andr 1 , . . . ,r n ∈ Sub(ϕ). Let G(r 1 , ..., r n ) be the Gödel logic enriched with finitely many nullary predicater 1 , ...,r n introduced in [10] . Note that any sentence which is derivable in G(r 1 , ..., r n ) can also be derived in RGL * . The set Ax(r 1 , ..., r n ) of book-keeping axioms of G(r 1 , ..., r n ) can also be viewed as an L ∪ {r 1 , ...,r n }-theory in first-order Gödel logic. This means thatr 1 , ...,r n are treated as nullary predicates. Hence, Ax(r 1 , ..., r n ) ϕ in (standard) first-order Gödel logic. Now, on the basis of standard completeness theorem of Gödel logic, there is a countable structure M, whose truth values take place in [0, 1] such that ϕ M > 0. Note that for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,r i may not be interpreted by r i . Let
Take α = max{r > 0 |r M = 0,r ∈ Sub(ϕ)} ∪ {0}. Since X is countable there is a continuous order-preserving map g : X → [α, 1] 2 such that g(r) =r, for every r > α and g(0 M ) =α. We construct an L-structure N as follows. Let the universe of N as well as the interpretations of function and constant symbols remain the same as the structure M. For every predicate symbol P andā ∈ M , define
We claim that for every
The claim can be proved by induction.
1. For atomic formulas, the connectives ∧, ∨, and the quantifier ∀, the induction is routine. a,b) ) >α for every a ∈ M . By the continuity of g, we have • If for every a ∈ M , ψ
Let ψ(x)
The following theorem establishes some connections between the strong entailment and deduction. Proof. (1). Let Σ = {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n }. If {ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n } s |= ϕ then for all L-structures M, is not satisfiable. We claim that Σ 0
Then, by interpreting the nullary predicate γ by α, we may get an L ′ expansion N of M which is a model of Σ ′ , a contradiction. Whence, as Σ 0 is finite, by (1) we have Σ 0 ⊢ n −1 → ϕ. Hence, for any n ∈ N, Σ ⊢ n −1 → ϕ.
In the following theorem an approximate version of entailment compactness is established. Theorem 2.24. Let T be an L-theory and ϕ be an L-sentence. T |= ϕ if and only if for every n ∈ N, there is a finite subset T n of T such that T n |= n −1 → ϕ.
Proof. Let T |= ϕ. Suppose on the contrary that, there exists n ∈ N such that for any finite subset S of T , S n −1 → ϕ. Thus, for any finite subset S of T there is an L-structure M of S such that M n −1 → ϕ. So, M |= ϕ → n −1 , i.e., S ∪ {ϕ → n −1 } is satisfiable. But, S is an arbitrary finite subset of T and so, T ∪ {ϕ → n −1 } is finitely satisfiable. Now, the compactness theorem implies that T ∪ {ϕ → n −1 } is satisfiable. But, this contradicts T |= ϕ. Conversely, suppose that for any n ∈ N there is a finite subset T n of T such that T n |= n −1 → ϕ. We want to show that T |= ϕ. Suppose not. Hence, there exists an L-structure M of T such that M ϕ. So, there is a natural number n such that ϕ M ≥ n −1 . This means for any finite subset S of T , S n −1 → ϕ, a contradiction. Using this function one may translate all semantical issues of RLG * , e.g, satisfiability and (strong) entailment to the fuzzy first-order rational Gödel logic. Hence all the results given in this section remain valid for the fuzzy first-order rational Gödel logic.
Ultrametric Logic
In first-order classical logic the equality relation has the following properties,
While (S1-S3) are called the similarity axioms, (E1,E2) are named the extensionality axioms. The next lemma shows the meaning of the above axioms in RGL * .
We are interested in obtaining an extended ultrametric instead of an extended pseudo-ultrametric. To this end, we need a weaker translation of the extensionality axioms.
Following continuous first-order logic, we replace (E1,E2) by somewhat weaker axioms, ensuring that the interpretation of all function and predicate symbols are uniformly continuous, i.e., for any n ∈ N, there exist m P , m f ∈ N such that for allā,b ∈ M ,
Definition 3.3.
A first-order language L with a distinguished binary relation "d" together with a set of modulus of uniform continuity functions {δ e : N → N : e is either a function or predicate symbol } is called a continuous ultrametric language.
Denote the equivalence class of a ∈ M by [a] ∼ . Now, let M 0 be the set of the equivalence classes of ∼ in M . Define
is an extended ultrametric space. Furthermore, for any predicate and function symbols P and f set
The uniform continuity of the interpretation of predicate and function symbols in M implies that the above definitions are well-defined. So, if predicate and function symbols satisfy the uniform continuity axioms then we get an
The axiom system of ultrametric logic consists of the axioms of RGL * together with the following axioms:
for any function symbol f , and any predicate symbol P and any natural number n,
The inference rules are the same as RGL * . The ultrametric logic is denoted by UML.
Corollary 3.8. Any strongly consistent (resp. finitely satisfiable) theory is satisfiable in UML.
Some Model Theory for Ultrametric Logic
In this section, some model theory for UML is developed. Using the machinery developed here, the Robinson consistency theorem (Theorem 4.15) is proved. To simplify the notation, by an L-structure we mean an ultrametric L-structure. 2. An embedding is a function j : M → N with the following properties. For any function symbol f and predicate symbol P ,
It is easy to see that for every quantifier-free L-formula ϕ(x) and any elementā ∈ M n , ( * ) ϕ M (a 1 , ..., a n ) = ϕ N j(a 1 ), ..., j(a n ) .
Moreover, an embedding is an isometry, i.e., d
3. The embedding j is elementary, if ( * ) holds for any L-formula ϕ(x). In this case, j is denoted by j : M ֒→ N .
4. An isomorphism is a surjective elementary embedding.
Remark 4.2. The notion of substructure (resp. elementary substructure) is a special case of the above definition, where M ⊆ N and the inclusion map is embedding (resp. elementary embedding). In this case, we write M ⊆ N (resp. M N ).
While in first-order logic or even in continuous first-order logic the notion of embedding (resp. elementary embedding) can be captured by means of the notion of diagram (resp. elementary diagram), the lack of such feature for ultrametric logic leads to the following definitions.
Definition 4.5. Let M and N be two L-structures.
where {c m } m∈M are some new constant symbols. One can naturally interpret any c m inside the L-structure M by m. So, any L-structure M can be viewed as an L(M )-structure. Now, the
If there is no danger of confusion we may drop the subscript L and simply write j : M w ֒→ N and wediag(M).
The following lemma justifies why we call T h L(M) (M) a weak elementary diagram, and why we need the additional concepts that are defined in Definition 4.5. Proof. Since j is a weak elementary embedding, the following two subsets of I
.., a n ∈ N } satisfy the following properties:
By the same idea used in Theorem 2.19, one may find a continuous order preserving function h : j(a 1 ) , ..., j(a n ))) = ϕ N (a 1 , ..., a n ). Now, define an L-structure B ′ in such a way that the interpretations of constant and function symbols are the same as B and for any predicate P , we have P 
Without loss of generality, we may assume that L B ∩L D = L(E). One can naturally interpret the new constants c e and c b for e ∈ E and b ∈ B inside the L-structure B by j(e) and b, respectively. Also, B can be considered as an L B -structure. We want to show that wediag(B) ∪ wediag(D) is a satisfiable L ′ -theory. Below, the notion of direct limit of a family of sets and functions is defined and then, using this concept, the notion of pseudo-direct limit of a weak elementary chain of L-structures is introduced. Definition 4.11. Let (M i ) i∈N be a family of pairwise disjoint sets. Suppose also (f i,j : M i → M j ) i≤j∈N is a family of functions. Call F = {(M i ) i∈N , (f i,j ) i≤j∈N } a direct system, if the following properties hold:
The equivalence classes of ≡ F is denoted by [a] F . The set of all equivalence classes of ≡ F is also denoted by lim F M i .
It is customary to call lim F M i the direct limit of the direct system F . 
Also, for every L ∞ -formula ϕ(x,c), take n ϕ to be the least natural number such that ϕ(x,c) is an L nϕ -formula and put
Note that if ∀x ϕ(x,c) ∈ S i then n ϕ ≤ i. In the sequel, we show that
is a satisfiable Henkin L ∞ -theory and has a model M with the universe M = lim F C i , where
To show that Σ is satisfiable, for any n ∈ N, consider the L n -theory
Let M n be the expansion of the L-structure M n to an L n -structure such that c
So, M n |= ∆ i for any i ≤ n. Furthermore, for any n ≥ n ϕ whenever ∀x ϕ(x,c) ∈ n i=1 S i , ∀x ϕ(x,c) ∈ Γ nϕ . Hence, M nϕ |= ∀x ϕ(x,c). This implies M n |= ∀x ϕ(x,c) and M n |= Σ n . So, Σ n is satisfiable and by the compactness theorem, Σ is satisfiable. Secondly, to verify that Σ is Henkin, let Σ ∀x ϕ(x,c). In particular, ∀x ϕ(x,c) / ∈ Σ. So, ∀x ϕ(x,c) / ∈ Γ nϕ and therefore, ∀x ϕ(x,c) Mn ϕ >0. This means that there is a rational number r > 0 such that ∀x ϕ(x,c) Mn ϕ >r. Thus, there
Hence, Σ ϕ(c d ,c). If not, then for some n ≥ n ϕ , Σ n ⊢ ϕ(c d ,c). Thus, by soundness Σ n |= ϕ(c d ,c). Now, since M n |= Σ n it follows that ϕ Mn (c d ,c) =0. But, this contradicts with (7) . Take an L ∞ -theory Σ ′ to be a maximally linear complete extension of Σ. This extension remains Henkin. If Σ ′ ∀x ϕ (x, c m1 , . . . , c mn ) then Σ ∀x ϕ(x, c m1 , . . . , c mn ) . Now, as Σ is Henkin, by a similar argument used in the above paragraph there exist a constant c and a rational number r > 0 such that ϕ(c, c m1 , . . . , c mn ) → r ∈ Σ. Thus, Σ ′ ⊢ ϕ(c, c m1 , . . . , c mn ) →r, that is Σ ′ ϕ(c, c m1 , . . . , c mn ). The method used in the proof of the completeness theorem implies that there is an L ∞ -structure M whose universe is the interpretation of the set of constant symbols ∪ i∈N C i . One can easily see that M = lim F M i . And, moreover, for any i ∈ N, the function h i : Remark 4.14. On the basis of the above lemma, call {M ∞ , (h i : M i w ֒→ M ∞ ) i∈N } a pseudo-direct limit, since the proof does not guarantee the uniqueness of the desired structure. Hence, it may be easily seen that if M ∞ and N ∞ are two pseudo-direct limit of a direct system, then M ∞ ≡ h N ∞ for some h : I → I. M∞ (x, y) = d N (H(x), H(y)). So, H is one to one. Therefore, H is an L-isomorphism of M ∞ onto N . Hence, there is an ultrametric L 1 ∪ L 2 -structure P such that P| L1 = M ∞ and P| L2 ∼ = N . Thus, P |= T 1 ∪ T 2 .
Remark 4.16. The translation given in Remark 2.25 can be easily applied to the present context to show that the Robinson joint consistency theorem (Theorem 4.15) holds for (fuzzy) first-order rational Gödel logic with equality.
Future Works
One should further develop the ultrametric logic to make it more accessible for axiomatizing interesting mathematical structures such as valued fields and padic fields. To this end, one may consider a more general value space and perhaps some additional logical connectives. Any possible approach should allow us to extend the basic results such as completeness and compactness theorems even for uncountable languages. Therefore, the extended semantic should also include "uncountable" structures.
Another interesting topic of research is to study the Robinson joint consistency theorem for first-order (rational) Gödel logic.
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